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RECONCILING MORSE WITH BRANDENBURG
Steven Penaro*
This Note examines Morse v. Frederick in connection with the
Brandenburg v. Ohio test governing speech that advocates unlawful acts.
In Morse, the U.S. Supreme Court devised a new test that gives school
officials the power to restrict student speech promoting the use of illegal
drugs. However, in Brandenburg, the Supreme Court held that speech must
be struck down if the speaker intends to incite imminent lawless action and
that speech is likely to produce such action. This Note argues that a
relaxed application of the Brandenburg standard would be useful in
prohibiting student drug speech within a school setting.
INTRODUCTION
On January 24, 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay passed through Juneau,
Alaska along a street in front of Juneau-Douglas High School (JDHS)
during school hours. 1  When the torchbearers and camera crews
broadcasting the event on national television traveled near the school,
Joseph Frederick, a JDHS senior, and his friends unfurled a fourteen-foot
banner bearing the phrase: "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."'2 The banner was
directed toward the school, visible to most students.3 Upon viewing the
banner, Principal Deborah Morse immediately confiscated it and suspended
Frederick for ten days, consistent with school policy.4 After Frederick
appealed his suspension, the JDHS superintendent declared that Morse's
actions were "permissible because Frederick's banner was 'speech or action
that intrudes upon the work of the schools. '" '5 Soon thereafter, Frederick
filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the school board and
Morse had violated his First Amendment right to free speech.
6
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. in History, 2005, College
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1. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 2622-23. "IDHS Policy No. 5520 states: 'The Board specifically
prohibits any assembly or public expression that.., advocates the use of substances that are
illegal to minors."' Id. at 2623.
5. Id.
6. See id. The U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment
for Juneau-Douglas High School, ruling that it was entitled to qualified immunity and that
the school did not infringe on Joseph Frederick's First Amendment rights. Id. Frederick
appealed. Id. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
"[W]hile children assuredly do not 'shed their constitutional rights ... at
the schoolhouse gate,' . . . the nature of those rights is what is appropriate
for children in school."' 7 Imagine teachers powerless to discipline a student
for making off-color comments. Imagine students free to say whatever they
want to whomever they want during class. These examples of extreme
disorder can become a reality if the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech
Clause is applied strictly within a school setting. 8 However, after years of
judicial scrutiny and a long line of cases, the Supreme Court determined
that the First Amendment rights of students in schools are not identical to
those of adults outside of the school context. 9 This does not mean that
students forfeit their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression in school.10 Rather, schoolchildren enjoy somewhat altered
rights to accommodate their unique standing in society."I
Nearly five years after Frederick displayed his controversial banner, the
Supreme Court in Morse v. Frederick12 ruled in favor of JDHS, holding that
school officials may prohibit speech promoting illegal drug use without
violating a student's First Amendment rights.' 3 Although the Court was
presented with a case involving student speech, it did not find traditional
school speech jurisprudence directly applicable.' 4  Instead, Morse
established a new category of prohibited school speech-speech advocating
illegal drug use. 15 In doing so, the Court seemingly relied on the principles
established in Brandenburg v. Ohio,16 yet the majority failed to discuss the
case at all, and the dissent believed a genuine application of Brandenburg
would have changed the Court's holding. 17
The test established in Brandenburg restricts speech when the speaker
intends to incite imminent lawless action and the speech is likely to produce
such action. Although speech inciting lawless acts can and does arise in a
school setting, the test in Brandenburg has never been used in relation to
school speech. This Note argues that the Brandenburg test can be useful in
restricting student drug speech if interpreted in a relaxed fashion within a
court, reasoning that Frederick's First Amendment rights were violated because the school
punished Frederick without demonstrating that his speech threatened substantial disruption.
Id. The Ninth Circuit also held that Principal Deborah Morse was not entitled to qualified
immunity because Frederick's right to display the banner was so clearly established that a
reasonable principal in Morse's position would have understood that her actions were
unconstitutional. Id. at 2623-24. Following the Ninth Circuit's ruling, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Id. at 2619.
7. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
10. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
11. See infra Part II.C.3.
12. 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
13. See id. at 2622.
14. Id. at 2622; see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Fraser,
478 U.S. at 675; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
15. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
16. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
17. See infra Part I.C. 1-2.
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school context. Furthermore, while there is no precedent regarding how
this standard should apply in an American public school setting, this Note
argues that the Brandenburg test can, and should, be applied in schools. In
fact, the Brandenburg standard has mainly been applied to threats of
violence in connection with political speech. 18  However, inherent
ambiguities provide the Brandenburg standard with flexibility, allowing for
an extremely circumstantial and individualized application, while also
offering school officials a workable standard. Brandenburg also explains
the narrow holding in Morse.
This Note examines how Brandenburg and its well-established test
should apply in a school setting. 19 First, it analyzes student speech in
school settings, establishing the framework through which the Morse case
must be viewed. Next, it examines restrictions on speech that incites
unlawful action. Part I explores the particulars of the Morse decision. It
first explains the majority and dissenting opinions, and then demonstrates
how the Brandenburg test can be applied, either in a strict sense or in a
more relaxed fashion, to the facts of the Morse case. Part II, illustrates the
arguments for both a strict and relaxed application of Brandenburg and
discusses the special considerations implicit in a school setting. Finally,
Part III suggests an easing of the Brandenburg standard when it is applied
to schools. 20
1. HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS ON FREE SPEECH
Part L.A discusses First Amendment jurisprudence in public schools.
Next, Part I.B analyzes the development of case law involving speech
inciting unlawful acts. Finally, Part I.C examines the majority and
dissenting opinions of Morse. Part I.C. 1 discusses the narrow holding of
the majority, while Part I.C.2 summarizes the dissenting opinion's rejection
of the Brandenburg standard.
A. Schools' Right to Prohibit Speech: First Amendment Jurisprudence in
Public Schools
This section discusses the development of existing school speech
jurisprudence prior to the Morse decision. Over the past several decades,
the Supreme Court has developed a legal framework for cases involving
students' First Amendment rights. 2 1 Faced with a rigorous balancing act,
18. See generally NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra notes 316-30 and accompanying text.
21. See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969); see also Elliot M. Mincberg, A Practical Approach to Tinker and Its
Progeny, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 519, 520 (1995). Under the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood
framework, three basic approaches are available to practitioners. Id. First, the practitioner
should attempt to characterize the activity as non-school-sponsored in order to fit it within
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the Court weighed the rights and interests of schoolchildren against the
overwhelming concern for order and stability within the American public
school system and has determined that "the constitutional rights of students
in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults
in other settings." 22 Through a series of detailed opinions, the Court has
gradually given schools much greater discretion in prohibiting certain
speech within a school setting.23
In the landmark decision of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,24 a group of high school students wore black
armbands during class as a silent protest against the Vietnam War. The
Court held that freedom of expression of personal views is permissible so
long as students do not substantially disrupt the work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students. 25 The Court relied upon the
notion that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 26 In Tinker, the Court struck
a balance between students' inherent First Amendment rights and the need
for school officials to retain necessary control in order to fulfill their
educational obligations.27 Although the Court in Tinker ruled in favor of
the students, recognizing their First Amendment rights, it established that
the principles of the First Amendment are not absolute and do not extend to
speech in the school setting given the "need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials . . . to
prescribe and control conduct in the schools." 28
Years later, the Court furthered the development of school speech
jurisprudence in Bethel School District. No. 403 v. Fraser.29 In Fraser, a
high school student was disciplined for giving a speech filled with sexual
the Tinker framework. Id. Second, "the practitioner should characterize the expressive
activity as one within the recognized categories that limit Hazelwood." Id. Finally, the
practitioner can claim that the school has removed the activity from school-sponsored
speech. Id.
22. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
23. See generally Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-87; Tinker,
393 U.S. at 505-06.
24. 393 U.S. 503.
25. See id. at 511-13; see also Andrew H. Montroll, Students' Free Speech Rights in
Public Schools: Content-Based Versus Public Forum Restrictions, 13 VT. L. REv. 493, 511
(1989) (arguing that the Tinker standard is a public forum test and under Tinker, a school
becomes a limited public forum for student speech when school officials permit some
students to speak).
26. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
27. See, e.g., Anthony B. Schutz, Public School Restrictions on "Offensive" Student
Speech in Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000): Has
Fraser's "Exception " Swallowed Tinker's Rule?, 81 NEB. L. REv. 443, 448 (2002).
28. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; see also Walter E. Forehand, Constitutional Law
Tinkering with Tinker: Academic Freedom in the Public Schools-Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988), 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 159, 160 (1988)
(explaining that Tinker established two schools of thought that courts must confront:
deference to the broad authority of school officials versus the constitutional guarantees of
teachers and students).
29. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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innuendos to the entire student body. This prompted the Court to hold that
the school had the authority to prohibit lewd, vulgar, or offensive speech
even if it did not disrupt schoolwork.30 According to the Court in Fraser,
"it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse." 31 The Court
distinguished its holding in Tinker by stating that the restriction was based
upon the sexually vulgar, lewd, and indecent content of the message. 32 It
also emphasized that vulgar, lewd, and indecent speech will inevitably
intrude on the work of the schools or rights of others. 33 According to
Fraser, schools are responsible to teach students the "fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system. '34 In
furtherance of that goal, Fraser permitted schools to prohibit inappropriate
speech that would infringe upon the teaching of fundamental values. 35
A further refinement on student speech came in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier,36 where a school censored articles in a school
newspaper, written as part of a journalism class, pertaining to students'
experiences with pregnancy and the impact of divorce on students at
school.37  The Court ruled that educators do not offend the First
Amendment rights of schoolchildren by exercising control over student
speech in school-sponsored activities so long as the school's actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 38  The Court
extended the school's restrictive powers over speech beyond the confines of
a traditional classroom setting, "so long as [the activities] are supervised by
30. See id. at 677-79; see also James C. Dever III, Tinker Revisited: Fraser v. Bethel
School District and Regulation of Speech in the Public Schools, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1164, 1165
(discussing that the school regulation in Fraser was "a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction that justified disciplining the student for delivering a crude and sexually
suggestive speech at the assembly"); see also Robert Block, Students' Shrinking First
Amendment Rights in the Public Schools: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 35
DEPAUL L. REv. 739, 759 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court misinterpreted the facts of
Fraser because Matthew N. Fraser's speech was given in a political arena in order to help
elect his candidate, and that it created ambiguity by failing to reconcile with Tinker).
31. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
32. See id. at 680; see also David L. Hudson, Jr. & John E. Ferguson, Jr., The Courts'
Inconsistent Treatment of Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 181, 206 (2002) (explaining that, if Fraser is applied too broadly, it
could swallow the Tinker test and eliminate First Amendment freedoms for public school
students). It is also argued that the Fraser standard should be limited to school-sponsored
speech and that all other student expression should be governed under the Tinker standard.
Id.
33. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
34. Id. at 683.
35. See id. at 685.
36. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
37. See id. at 263. The principal chose to delete two pages of text because he was
concerned that the identities of the pregnant students were not adequately concealed. Id. at
264. He also felt that the article's reference to sex and birth control was inappropriate for
some of the younger students, and that the parents of the child who was the subject of the
divorce article were not given a chance to adequately respond to the accusations. Id. at 262-
64.
38. See id. at 273.
2008]
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faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to
student participants and audiences." 39 According to the Court, schools are
justified in restricting student speech at a school-sponsored event when the
event attempts to assure "that participants learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to
material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the
views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
school."'40 From Tinker to Hazelwood, the Court recognized that students'
First Amendment rights were not identical to those of adults and gradually
gave greater deference to school officials.
B. Limiting Speech Regarding Unlawful Acts
In contrast to Part I.A, which dealt with schools' rights to prohibit
speech, Part I.B discusses the evolution of case law regarding speech
inciting unlawful acts. In an entirely separate line of cases, the Supreme
Court has examined the First Amendment and the Free Speech Clause as
applied to speech promoting unlawful acts.41 However, this line of cases
has never been applied in a school setting.42 Instead, the Supreme Court
has restricted the Free Speech Clause based on the content of the speech in
order to prohibit speech likely to result in harm.43 Generally, the Court had
been active in greatly restricting unlawful speech related to governmental
threats until its decision in Brandenburg.44 Brandenburg provided a more
protective approach than its predecessors in dealing with free speech and
unlawful acts.45 In holding that for speech to be restricted it must call for
imminent lawless action that is likely to produce such action, Brandenburg
gives the speaker a tremendous degree of freedom.46
39. Id. at 271.
40. Id.; see also Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School District and the Role of
First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 687-88. This Comment echoes the
Hazelwood dissent, explaining that the First Amendment should limit schools' discretion and
increase the autonomy for First Amendment institutions in order to advance our long-term
interest in sustaining individual. liberty. Id.
41. See infra notes 47-87 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 47-87 and accompanying text; see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.
Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007). The Court in Morse suggested that the Brandenburg standard could
be eased at school: "It is possible that our rigid imminence requirement ought to be relaxed
at schools." Id. (citation omitted).
43. See infra notes 47-87 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 47-80 and accompanying text; see also Rodney A. Smolla, Should
the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence Tort Cases?, 27 N. KY. L.
REv. 1, 12 (2000). "This strain of First Amendment tradition has historically dealt with the
unique problems posed by attempts to curb violent political discourse as it is manifest in
protest demonstrations, rallies, leafleting, picketing, boycotts, and similar collective political
and social activity." Id.
45. See infra notes 47-80 and accompanying text.
46. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969); see also infra notes 47-87
and accompanying text.
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The Court first addressed speech promoting unlawful acts in Schenck v.
United States,47 where the defendants printed a circular opposing military
conscription and distributed it to persons accepted for military service. 48 In
the opinion, written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court allowed
the government to prohibit the speech, insisting that the speech created a
"clear and present danger" that could bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. 49 This approach allowed the Court to
compare the circumstances surrounding the speech in connection with the
degree of danger the speech presents. 50 According to the Court, "the
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
done."' 5 1 The clear and present danger test offered the Court a way of
incorporating the circumstances surrounding speech into First Amendment
protection without ever showing that the speech, in isolation, presented a
substantial threat.52
A few weeks later, in Abrams v. United States,53 a case involving the
printing and distribution of two circulars written in both English and
Yiddish that denounced the sending of troops into Russia to oppose the
Russian Revolution, the Court upheld the convictions without applying the
recently devised clear and present danger test.54 However, in his now
famous dissent, Justice Holmes applied the clear and present danger test
articulated in Schenck in disagreeing with the majority's decision,
explaining that "[i]t is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent
to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression
of opinion where private rights are not concerned. ' 55 Justice Holmes also
advocated a standard that would allow for suppression of speech upon a
showing of the mere possibility of harm.5
6
47. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
48. See id. at 49.
49. Id. at 52. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes summarized the test: "The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." Id. The Court
held that Charles T. Schenck's leaflet constituted a clear and present danger and therefore
fell outside the scope of First Amendment protection. Id.
50. See, e.g., David G. Barnum, The Clear and Present Danger Test in Anglo-American
and European Law, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 263, 272 (2006).
51. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
52. See Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1159, 1166-67 (1982).
53. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
54. See id. at 622-24. Justice John Hessin Clarke upheld the convictions on the ground
that the defendants' purpose was "to create an attempt to defeat the war plans of the
Government of the United States, by bringing upon the country the paralysis of a general
strike, thereby arresting the production of all munitions and other things essential to the
conduct of the war." Id. at 622.
55. Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56. See id.; see also Edward J. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the "Clear and Present
Danger" Theory of the First Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1118, 1119-20 (1989). The
shift in Holmes' opinion in Abrams was compelled by the criticism of his friends and the
pressure of events. Id. Justice Holmes's critics also suggest that the change in his viewpoint
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Justice Holmes continued this more protective approach to dissident
speech in his dissent in Gitlow v. New York. 57 In Gitlow, the defendant
distributed a "Manifesto" condemning not only capitalism, but also
"moderate Socialism," and called for the "annihilation of the parliamentary
state."58 Although the majority upheld the conviction under New York's
Criminal Anarchy Statute, which prohibited advocating "that organized
government should be overthrown by force or violence," 59 Justice Holmes
again disagreed with the outcome and argued that the clear and present
danger test should have been applied.60 He asserted that there was "no
present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by force on the
part of the admittedly small minority who shared the defendant's views."'61
Two years later, the Court revisited this issue in Whitney v. California62
and once again failed to apply the clear and present danger test in the
majority opinion.63  The case involved a political activist who had
participated in a convention called to organize a branch of the Communist
Labor Party of America. The defendant was convicted of violating
California's criminal syndicalism statute, which made it a crime to advocate
for "the commission of crime, sabotage, . . . or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or
control, or effecting any political change." 64 Here, Justice Louis Brandeis,
joined by Justice Holmes in his concurrence, promoted the use of the clear
and present danger test and noted that a restriction cannot be imposed
"unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and
represented a radical transformation of his thinking. Id.; see also G. Edward White, Justice
Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80
CAL. L. REv. 391, 433 (1992) (noting that Justice Holmes used Abrams as an opportunity to
reformulate the meaning of the clear and present danger test devised in Schenck).
57. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
58. Id. at 656-59; see also Terry Heinrichs, Gitlow Redux: "Bad Tendencies" in the
Great White North, 48 WAYNE L. REv. 1101, 1105 (2002). Because the Manifesto's rhetoric
was virtually harmless, Gitlow
was not a case involving incitement in the narrow sense of inflamed rhetoric
directed on site to an audience ready and willing to act in the here and now, nor
was it a case which involved any such action attempted or carried out in the
immediate past. It was a case of extremist rhetoric directed mainly to party
members and workers attempting to persuade them of the need to take direct action
at some date in the future, perhaps even 'tens of years' down the road.
Id.
59. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 654.
60. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Philippa Strum, Brandeis: The Public Activist
and Freedom of Speech, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 659, 693 (2007) (explaining that Justice Edward
Terry Sanford dismissed the clear and present danger test as irrelevant in this context
because, in passing the statute, the state legislature found that such a danger did exist).
61. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673; see also Howard Owen Hunter, Problems in Search of
Principles: The First Amendment in the Supreme Court from 1791-1930, 35 EMORY L.J. 59,
119 (1986) ("The evidence in the Gitlow case did not support a finding of a clear and present
danger in the view of Justice Holmes, because there was no evidence of any ill effect from
the speech.").
62. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
63. See id. at 371-72.
64. See id. at 359-60.
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imminent danger of some substantive evil which the State constitutionally
may seek to prevent. '65 This concurrence provides a coherent formulation
of the clear and present danger test in its most protective form: "To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that
serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. '66
In both Gitlow and Whitney, the Court deferred to state legislative
judgment that certain speech is harmful and may be prohibited.67 Both
cases ignored the clear and present danger test in favor of a state legislation
approach. 68  The Court stated that "a State may punish utterances
endangering the foundations of organized government and threatening its
overthrow by unlawful means." 69 Furthermore, these cases argued that the
statutes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because "[a] state may
properly direct its legislation against what it deems an existing evil without
covering the whole field of possible abuses."'70
The next step in the evolution of the clear and present danger test came in
Dennis v. United States,71 in which the Court rejected the Gitlow- Whitney
state legislative judgment approach.72 In Dennis, the defendants were
leaders of the American Communist Party who had been convicted of
violating the Smith Act, 73 which criminalizes the organization of any
society, group, or assembly of people who advocate or encourage the
overthrow of the United States government by force or violence. 74 The
Court applied the principles of the clear and present danger test but severely
altered the test's structure. 75 Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson applied the test
in a situation of unlawful advocacy stating, "[i]n each [case, courts] must
ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. '76
65. Id. at 373.
66. Id. at 376; see also Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic
Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653,
668 (1988) ("[Tlhe opinion dwells almost exclusively on what might be considered the
cornerstone issue of first amendment interpretation: namely, under what circumstances does
the first amendment prohibit the government from making the advocacy of revolution a
crime?").
67. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372; Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 670.
68. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
69. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 667.
70. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 370.
71. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
72. See id. at 507-10.
73. See Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000).
74. See id.
75. See THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970); see also
Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 751 (1975) ("[T]he Vinson Court in
Dennis restated clear and present danger in a manner draining it of most of the immediacy
emphasis it had attained over the years.").
76. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950)
(internal quotations omitted)); see Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand. Clear and
Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 209, 231 (1995).
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This altered test focused on the probability and gravity of harm, finding that
the graver the evil promoted by the speech, the less probable need be its
occurrence before the government is justified in suppressing the speech.77
Basically, this test permitted suppression of speech that is a threat of great
evil irrespective of whether it is imminent. 78
From Schenck to Dennis, the Court created a malleable test able to shift
on a circumstantial basis. 79 The first half of the twentieth century was
defined by a Court with great power in restricting speech related to
unlawful acts in connection with governmental affairs. 80
Finally, in 1969, the Court developed a more concrete and protective
approach to free speech issues under the First Amendment. In
Brandenburg, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group arranged for a local
Cincinnati television station to cover a speech, in which he stated "[w]e're
not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our President, our Congress, our
Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's
possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken." The
Court declared the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute 81 unconstitutional. 82
In declaring the Ohio statute unconstitutional, the Brandenburg Court
asserted that the statute failed to distinguish between "mere advocacy" and
"incitement to imminent lawless action."' 83  Under Brandenburg, a
legislature may prohibit advocacy of unlawful action without violating the
First Amendment rights of the speaker when the speaker intends to incite an
imminent lawless action, 84 and that lawless action is likely to occur.85
Dennis was the most important case in which the Court applied the clear and present danger
test. Id. However, it was an altered version of the clear and present danger test that was
heavily influenced by Judge Learned Hand, whose lower court version of the Holmes test
was adopted by Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson's opinion. Id.; see also Christina E. Wells,
Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 115, 119 (using
Dennis as a case study, and exploring the psychological influences that may lead judges to
succumb to fear and prejudice and to abdicate their judicial role).
77. See Redish, supra note 52, at 1166.
78. See id.
79. See supra notes 47-78 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 47-78 and accompanying text.
81. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-46 (1969) (The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism
statute criminalized advocating, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of bringing about political reform).
82. See id. at 445.
83. Id. at 449; see also Hans A. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined:
Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1165 (1970) (citing
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49). "[T]he mere abstract teaching.., of the moral propriety
or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a
group for violent action and steeling it to such action. A statute which fails to draw this
distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (citing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,
297-98 (1961)).
84. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
85. Id.; see also Douglas E. Plocki, Harm Advocacy Theory: Where to Draw the Line
Between Free Speech and Criminal Advocacy, 12 Geo. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 29, 52-53
(2001) ("Under Brandenburg, criminal advocacy can only be punished when (1) the speaker
advocates imminent illegal conduct, (2) intends to incite either the use of force or illegal
[Vol. 77
2008] RECONCILING MORSE WITH BRANDENBURG 261
Thus, the Brandenburg test requires the fulfillment of both intent and
effect. 86 This test is clearly separate from the clear and present danger test
and more firm and protective in its application.
87
Immediately following the decision in Brandenburg, legal scholars and
commentators exhibited great confusion.88 One source of confusion was
reconciling the new Brandenburg standard with other tests from recent
precedent:
Imminent lawless action? Likely to incite or produce such action? [Other]
opinions took pains to deny that the unlawful action advocated need be
'imminent,' or that the advocacy need be 'likely' to produce the forbidden
action; they appeared to hold that intentional incitement to concrete,
unlawful action, no matter how distant or unlikely, was not 'protected
speech.' 89
Not only did the Brandenburg decision seem to reject previous case law, it
also appeared to many to be ambiguous, inviting several unanswered
questions: "Why, then, reintroduce the objective criteria of imminence and
probability... ? Is the fourth element-objective danger-part of the first
amendment analysis of a statute or not?" 90  Clearly, Brandenburg left
behind several unanswered questions.9 1 From the establishment of the clear
and present danger test to the more protective incitement test of
Brandenburg, the Court has radically transformed its evaluation of unlawful
speech, giving more protection to the speaker.
As previously stated, Brandenburg and the line of cases from which it
derived have never been directly applied in a school setting or to speech
promoting illegal drug use.92 This precedent has almost exclusively been
applied to unlawful speech related to politics. 93
C. Morse v. Frederick
This section examines both the majority and dissenting opinions of
Morse and how they rationalize their positions in light of the Brandenburg
conduct, and (3) the speech is likely to incite such conduct." (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S.
at 447)).
86. See id.
87. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
88. See e.g., Linde, supra note 83, at 1163.
89. See id. at 1167 (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 321-22 (1957))
(explaining that the action advocated for might arise in the undefined future in which case,
the court will examine the content of the proscribed advocacy, not the immediacy of any
danger it might create); see also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (including jury
instructions that excluded requirements for immediacy and likelihood).
90. Linde, supra note 83, at 1167.
91. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 47-87 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 47-87 and accompanying text; see also S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy
& Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond
Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1159, 1168 (2000) (explaining that the Brandenburg
test was "designed to protect political speech and the abstract advocacy of violence or
revolution").
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test. In Morse, a case involving student speech advocating illegal drug use,
the Court devised a new standard allowing schools to prohibit pro-drug
speech although it seemed clear that the speech was in line with the
traditional school speech jurisprudence of Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood
and the Brandenburg line of cases dealing with inciting lawless acts.
94 It
also seems plausible that the speech in Morse could have been interpreted
either as speech substantially disrupting the work of the school prohibited
under Tinker or as offensive speech in a school environment prohibited
under Fraser.95 However, the Court accepted the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation that the speech did not present a risk of
substantial disruption under Tinker.96  The Court also reasoned that
applying Fraser and determining the speech to be offensive would have
"stretch[ed] Fraser too far." 97  As the traditional school speech
jurisprudence was considered inapplicable, the Court could have sought
guidance from the relevant precedent regarding the incitement of unlawful
action but instead chose to develop a bright line rule through a narrow
holding. 98
1. Majority Opinion: A New, Narrow Test
In the majority opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court
formulated a unique and narrow holding that prohibited speech promoting
illegal drugs in a public school context because those viewing the student's
banner would interpret the message as advocating or promoting illegal drug
use.99 The Court relied on the belief that the banner, while not saying "do
drugs now," would have the same effect on those reading it as if it had
made the message explicit. 100 According to the majority, the principal's
interpretation of the banner as promoting illegal drugs was reasonable
because she believed that it would be understood by students and others as a
reference to smoking marijuana. 10 1 Not only did the Court agree with
94. See supra Part I.A-B.
95. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
96. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2623-24 (2007); see Frederick v. Morse, 439
F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that Frederick's First Amendment rights were
violated when he was censored and punished for unfurling his banner because, under Tinker,
Frederick's speech did not substantially disrupt a school activity).
97. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629. The Court also explained that Hazelwood was not
applicable in this case "because no one would reasonably believe that Frederick's banner
bore the school's imprimatur." Id. at 2627.
98. See id. at 2629.
99. See id.; see also The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-Leading Cases, 121 HARv. L.
REv. 295, 296 (2007) ("In its eagerness to allow schools to prohibit pro-drug speech, the
Court failed to provide any contained or compelling justification for its newly created
exception to the First Amendment. As a result, schools and courts will have wide latitude
not only in deciding how and when to apply Frederick to student drug-related speech, but
also in deciding what other viewpoints are simply outside a student's right to freedom of
expression.").
100. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624-25.
101. See id.
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Principal Morse's assessment of the banner, but it asserted that the message
could be interpreted as either an imperative statement encouraging the use
of drugs or a celebration of marijuana: '[Take] bong hits... '-a message
equivalent, as Morse explained in her declaration, to 'smoke marijuana' or
'use an illegal drug.' . . . the phrase could [also] be viewed as celebrating
drug use-'bong hits [are a good thing].," 10 2
In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts recognized drug abuse as a serious
problem for our nation's youth: 10 3 "'School years are the time when the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe....
[T]he effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users,
but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is
disrupted.""' 10 4 The opinion refers to the fact that Congress has required the
schools to educate students about the dangers of drug abuse. 105 As Chief
Justice Roberts stated, "[t]he particular concern [here is] to prevent student
drug abuse." 10 6
The Morse Court only briefly mentioned Brandenburg in response to the
dissent by suggesting that Brandenburg's imminence requirement might be
relaxed in schools. 10 7  Justice Clarence Thomas concurred but wrote
separately in order to express that Tinker was decided without basis in the
Constitution. 10 8  Justice Thomas's concurrence, which focused on the
history of public school education and how the First Amendment does not
protect student speech in public schools, made no reference to
Brandenburg.10 9 Justices Samuel Alito and Anthony Kennedy joined the
Court in holding that a public school may restrict speech interpreted as
advocating illegal drug use, but would not support restriction of speech
regarding political or social issues. 110  Unlike Justice Thomas's
concurrence, Justices Alito and Kennedy did make reference to
Brandenburg."'1 However, while Justices Alito and Kennedy cited to
Brandenburg, they found it inapplicable in the Morse case because, "due to
the special features of the school environment, school officials must have
greater authority to intervene before speech leads to violence." 12 Justice
Stephen Breyer, writing separately, noted that the Court should have held
that qualified immunity barred the student's claim, and that he wished to
102. Id. at 2625.
103. See id. at 2628-29.
104. Id. at 2628 (citing Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1995)).
105. See id. (explaining that Congress recently passed the Safe and Drug-Free Schools
and Communities Act of 1994 in order to combat messages similar to Frederick's).
106. Id. at 2629.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 2629-30 (Thomas, J., concurring).
109. See id. at 2630-31. Justice Clarence Thomas argued that, historically, under the
legal doctrine of in loco parentis, courts have upheld the right of schools to discipline
students to enforce rules and to maintain order. Id. at 263 1.
110. See id. at 2636.
111. See id. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
112. Id.
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leave the First Amendment issue untouched. 113 Although Justice Breyer
never explicitly mentioned Brandenburg, he acknowledged the possibility
that encouraging drug use might be acted upon and lead to harm. 114
2. Dissenting Opinion: The Rejection of the Brandenburg Standard
It is only in Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's dissent that Brandenburg is applied to the facts of Morse.1 15 In
applying Brandenburg, the dissent reasoned that the student's speech could
not be restricted under the Brandenburg incitement test: 116  "'promoting
illegal drug use' comes nowhere close to proscribable 'incitement to
imminent lawless action."'1 17 The dissent asserted that "'the advocacy falls
short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would
be immediately acted upon.' 118
Unlike the majority, the dissent viewed the student's banner as "a
nonsense message, not advocacy." 119 The dissent paid particularly close
attention to the student's desire to get on television rather than promote
illegal drugs. 120 For the dissent, "[t]he notion that the message on this
banner would actually persuade either the average student or even the
dumbest one to change his or her behavior is most implausible."' 12 1
The dissent also explored the possibility that the student's speech may
have been political in nature, thus deserving of protection under the First
Amendment:12 2 "[t]he Court's opinion ignores the fact that the legalization
of marijuana is an issue of considerable public concern in Alaska."'123 Here,
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg criticized the majority for taking a
113. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. See id. at 2638-40. Justice John Paul Stevens further explicated the point:
"Encouraging drug use might well increase the likelihood that a listener will try an illegal
drug ... [because] '[e]very denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase
the probability that there will be a violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the
probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability.... [A]dvocacy of law-breaking
heightens it still further." Id. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
115. See id. at 2645-46.
116. See id. at 2643.
117. Id. at 2645 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969)).
118. Id. at 2645-46 (citing Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring)). The
dissent argues that "[n]o one seriously maintains that drug advocacy (much less Frederick's
ridiculous sign) comes within the vanishingly small category of speech that can be
prohibited because of its feared consequences. Such advocacy, to borrow from Justice
Holmes, 'ha[s] no chance of starting a present conflagration."' Id. at 2646 (quoting Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
119. Id. at 2649.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 2650-51; see also Marshall H. Tanick & Phillip J. Trobaugh, From Tinker
to "Bong" The School Bell Tolls for Student Rights, 64 BENCH & B. MiNN. 18, 19 (2007)
(viewing Morse in a political context similar to Tinker and arguing that Morse seriously
hinders students' rights).
123. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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categorical approach to a sensitive political issue: 124 "the Court's ham-
handed, categorical approach is deaf to the constitutional imperative to
permit unfettered debate, even among high-school students, about . . .
legalizing marijuana for medicinal use." 12 5 Finally, the dissent also gave a
historical account of the crucial issue of the legalization of marijuana in
Alaska. 126  In sum, both the majority and dissent briefly cited to
Brandenburg, but neither viewed the Brandenburg test as an appropriate
means to determine the outcome of Morse.
II. STRICT AND RELAXED APPLICATIONS OF BRANDENBURG
While the Morse Court elected not to incorporate the Brandenburg test in
its decision, the dissent found that an application of Brandenburg would
prohibit the punishment of the drug-related speech.12 7 However, neither the
majority nor the dissent examined whether the Brandenburg test could be
modified to limit the free speech rights of students, as the Court previously
had done in the school setting. 128 Whether or not Brandenburg should be
applied in a school setting depends on whether it is applied in a strict or
relaxed fashion.
In general, supporters of both the strict and relaxed applications of the
Brandenburg standard advocate their views in the shadow of the First
Amendment. 129 The proponents of a strict approach give more deference
and greater weight to upholding the cherished principles of the First
Amendment, while those in support of a relaxed application promote their
views in light of the First Amendment but with a watchful eye on
security. 130 This part examines the strict applications of Brandenburg, like
that of the dissent in Morse, and the possibility of a less stringent analysis
of Brandenburg as applied to drug speech in the school setting. While
precedent tends to favor a strict application of Brandenburg, this part also
analyzes special circumstances surrounding both speech in the school
environment and speech promoting drug use. Part II.A details the
arguments supporting a strict application of the Brandenburg standard. Part
II.B then discusses the arguments supporting a relaxed application of the
Brandenburg standard. Finally, Part II.C examines the special
considerations innate in a school environment, while focusing on the effects
of speech promoting illegal drug use.
124. See id. at 2649.
125. Id.
126. See infra notes 305-07 and accompanying text.
127. See supra Part I.C.1-2.
128. See supra Part I.C.1.
129. See supra Part II.A-B.
130. See supra Part II.A-B.
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A. Strict Application of Brandenburg
This section discusses the arguments supporting a strict application of the
Brandenburg standard. "Because First Amendment freedoms need
breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity."' 13 1 When applied strictly, the Brandenburg standard
can provide for almost completely free speech. 132 Not only would the
speaker have to intend to incite an imminent unlawful act, but that act must
immediately follow the speech. 133 When Brandenburg is read strictly,
speech without a likelihood of immediate action will not meet the
Brandenburg standard. For example, in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises,134 a
case involving a book that contained detailed instructions on how to commit
a contract killing, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held
that the Brandenburg test was not satisfied because the murders were
committed a year after the book was received and only one murder occurred
after 13,000 copies were sold. 135 Thus, because of the length of time
between when the speech was published and when the reader acted, the
imminent requirement for the intent and effect elements was not fulfilled. 136
Ambiguous as it may have been, since its inception in 1969, the
Brandenburg test has proven to be a very difficult standard to meet, thus
giving far more protection to the speaker than the equally amorphous clear
and present danger test. 137  With difficult elements to prove, the
Brandenburg standard allows speakers nearly complete protection under the
First Amendment when applied strictly. 138 For example, in Hess v.
Indiana, 139 the Court overturned a conviction of an antiwar protestor who
yelled out, "We'll take the fucking street later" to a group of protestors
131. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 311 (1940)).
132. See generally NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
133. See Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Values of
Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 546 (2000); see also James L. Swanson, Unholy Fire: Cross
Burning, Symbolic Speech, and the First Amendment Virginia v. Black, 2003 CATO SUP. CT.
REv. 81, 99 ("Under Brandenburg... the imminence element is strict, and speech cannot be
suppressed unless it threatens to incite violence at that moment, or almost immediately.").
134. 128 F.3d 233, 264 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the lower court erred in its
judgment and the speech is unprotected under Brandenburg because the Brandenburg Court
meant to imply that when one prepares another for violent action when his speech is directed
to incite or produce that imminent lawless action, such preparation is not protected speech);
see Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons
of the McCarthy Era, 73 U. CN. L. REv. 9, 66 (2004). "The Rice court thus chose to adopt
the far less protective reading of the Brandenburg imminence test, where lack of imminence
is somehow equated not with the lack of an immediate temporal connection between
advocacy and harm (as both the common sense use of the word and its historical use by
Justice Brandeis in his Whitney concurrence necessarily suggest), but rather with purely
abstract advocacy, in the sense cryptically described in Yates." Id.
135. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 940 F. Supp. 836, 847 (D. Md. 1996).
136. See id.
137. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
139. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
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recently cleared off of a public space.140 The Court reasoned that this
language did not satisfy the Brandenburg standard, noting that it was
"nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future
time. ' 14 1 According to the Court, there was no evidence that these words
were likely to produce imminent disorder under Brandenburg.14 2 In fact,
Justice William 0. Douglas suggested in his Brandenburg concurrence that
the government may only punish speech when it is "brigaded with
action." 14 3
The strictness of the Brandenburg test could also be seen in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 144 in which several merchants in a small
Mississippi town sued to recover damages from a NAACP-sponsored
boycott. 145 In this case, Charles Evers, a leader of the boycott, warned the
audience that anyone breaking the boycott "would be answerable to him"
and "'have their necks broken' by their own people." 14 6 At a later speech,
Evers warned that violators of the boycott would be "disciplined," and that
the police could not protect them.1 47 Ultimately, the Court concluded that
Evers's remarks were not removed from the protection of the First
Amendment and could not be restricted under Brandenburg.14 8 According
to the Court, unless such speech incites lawless action, it must be protected
in light of "the 'profound national commitment' that 'debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' 14 9 The Brandenburg
test's stringent elements of intent, effect, and imminence make it extremely
difficult to demonstrate that restrictions on speech are warranted. 
150
The narrow interpretation of Brandenburg's elements can be traced back
to its roots in the clear and present danger test. 15 1 Not only does the
Brandenburg test seem to derive from the test articulated in Whitney, but it
is also similar in its interpretation: "There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.... [and] the evil to be
prevented is a serious one." 152 As noted by Justice Brandeis in his Whitney
concurrence, the imminence requirement can be defined as immediate.
153
140. Id. at 107.
141. Id. at 108.
142. See id. at 108-09.
143. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
144. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
145. See id. at 889-90.
146. Id. at 900 n.28.
147. Id. at 902. After the speeches, activists stationed outside of the stores recorded the
names of blacks who traded with white merchants and reported the blacks to the NAACP,
ostracizing those people from the black community. Id. at 903-04. In addition, at least four
violent incidents of retaliation occurred against those who violated the boycott, including
shots fired at a house, a rock thrown against a windshield, and the destruction of a flower
garden. Id. at 904.
148. See id. at 927-28.
149. Id. at 928 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
150. See supra notes 83-93, 137-49 and accompanying text.
151. See supra Part I.B.
152. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
153. See id.
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"In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown
... that immediate serious violence was to be expected ... .,,154 Although
Justice Brandeis in Whitney required "immediate serious violence," no clear
definition of this requirement was ever devised. 155
Supporters rationalize a strict application of the Brandenburg standard by
arguing that the government may only punish speech when it is "brigaded
with action."1 56  According to Justice Douglas's concurrence in
Brandenburg, "speech is . . . immune from prosecution . . . . and
government has no power to invade that sanctuary of belief and
conscience." 157 The proponents of a strict application of the Brandenburg
standard argue that the justification for punishing incitement lies in its
proximity to action. 158  The theoretical reasoning behind the narrow
interpretation of Brandenburg is connected to the notion that the First
Amendment protects speech and not actions and, "when speech increases
the likelihood of imminent violent action, it becomes analogous to an
action, to which the First Amendment affords less protection."' 159 It is only
when the Brandenburg standard is satisfied that speech becomes analogous
to actions that fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. 160
Proponents further assert that an attempt to impose liability on a speaker
without adequately satisfying the Brandenburg elements of intent and effect
will result in unconstitutional discrimination based on the content of the
speech. 16 1  "[R]ecent relaxation of these [Brandenburg] requirements
impermissibly infringes upon the Supreme Court's protection of abstract
advocacy which the Brandenburg decision was designed to protect." 162
Another argument raised in support of a strict application of the
Brandenburg test is derived from Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney
and is commonly referred to as the "more speech" argument. 63 According
to Justice Brandeis, "[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." 164 Basing his.
argument on the framers' intent, Justice Brandeis reasoned that fear of
serious harm cannot alone justify suppression of free speech. 165 By putting
154. Id.
155. See id.; see also Plocki, supra note 84, at 53.
156. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 457.
158. See Scott Hammack, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-line
Requires A Modification of the Courts' Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 65, 77 (2002).
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See Vivien Toomey Montz, Recent Incitement Claims Against Publishers and
Filmmakers: Restraints on First Amendment Rights or Proper Limits on Violent Speech?, 1
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 171, 205 (2002).
162. Id.
163. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 376.
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a more restrictive caveat on the already stringent clear and present danger
test, Justice Brandeis proclaimed that, when there is time for more speech
between the act and the social harm, it should be insisted upon rather than
leaping to conclusions as to whether or not the harm is truly a serious
threat. 166 Under this view, "[o]nly an emergency can justify repression." 167
With their firm adherence to the clear and present danger test, their
unwillingness to restrict speech, and their commitment to allowing the
opportunity for more speech, supporters of a strict application of
Brandenburg rely on rather traditional conceptions of free speech.
B. Relaxed Application of Brandenburg
This section examines the arguments in favor of relaxing the
Brandenburg test. Although the Brandenburg standard historically has
been applied strictly, a relaxed interpretation of the standard can give it the
teeth necessary to combat extraordinarily dangerous speech.168 A stringent
interpretation of the "likelihood" element comports with the Court's
tradition of permitting frivolous threats; however, supporters of a relaxed
Brandenburg application assert that requiring a rigid imminence standard in
every case is unrealistic and insensitive to societal interests. 169  "[A]
stringent imminence standard unduly restricts authorities' ability to deter
criminal conduct." 170 Under a strict approach, promoting a social harm on
a definite date in the future will be protected under the First Amendment
because the danger resulting from the speech will not be imminent as
required by the Brandenburg test. 171  By forbidding the courts from
restricting speech advocating probable harm in the future, a rigid
imminence requirement pushes First Amendment protection to an
"impractical extreme." 1 72  Proponents of a relaxed application of the
Brandenburg standard argue that, "[r]equiring imminence in every case in
the belief that[,] if it is not present[,] the advocacy will never lead to harm is
theoretically unjustifiable." 173
Employing a flexible imminence requirement can give courts the
necessary discretion for evaluating the level of immediacy, in each case
paying close attention to the surrounding circumstances. 174 Martin H.
166. See id. at 377.
167. Id.
168. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
169. See Redish, supra note 52, at 1180-81.
170. Id. (explaining that when a person advocates for violence on a definitive future date,
"imminence" in its legitimate meaning will prohibit the restriction of that speech).
171. See id.
172. Id. at 1181; see also Malloy & Krotoszynski supra note 93, at 1169. "Because
instructional books, songs, and movies generally require time for an individual to digest,
such materials generally will not meet Brandenburg's imminence requirement-a
requirement that demands that the speech cause an individual to act without rational
thought." Id.
173. Redish, supra note 52, at 1181.
174. See id.
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Redish, a professor at Northwestern University School of Law and a
supporter of a relaxed imminence requirement, champions a sliding scale,
with speech presenting a low level of immediacy and high likelihood of
harm on one end, and speech presenting a high level of immediacy and
indeterminable degree of likelihood of harm on the other end.175 "Where a
very serious offense is directly and forcefully advocated, a lesser showing
of imminence will justify suppression; at the other end of the scale, greater
evidence of imminence would be required in the case of indirect advocacy
of a less serious offense." 176
Furthermore, strict adherence to the imminence standard encounters
difficulty when applied to more modem forms of communication, such as
the Internet. 177 For example, if the imminence requirement is interpreted as
imminence from the speaker's perspective, then most Internet posts cannot
be categorized as intending to incite anything due to the large time lag that
often exists between when the speech was expressed and when it was
actually received. 178 The ambiguity of the imminence requirement has not
been adequately addressed in the courts, because under traditional forms of
communication, imminence from the perspective of the speaker and listener
are identical. 179 However, if the imminence requirement is interpreted
traditionally, that is, from the speaker's perspective, "the vast majority of
Internet communications can never constitute incitement, regardless of the
message. '"180 By basing their arguments on a more circumstantial platform,
proponents of a relaxed Brandenburg application argue in favor of its
flexibility.
C. Special Considerations in the School Setting
This section analyzes the special considerations implicit in both the
school environment and speech promoting illegal drug use.
1. Free Speech Versus Establishing Order
As the Supreme Court suggests, the balancing of rights changes in the
context of a school setting. Ultimately, the courts are presented with the
question of liberty versus order and must find a middle ground between
these two compelling interests, taking into account the extra concerns and
questions that accompany the unique situation of schoolchildren. 181
175. Id. at 1181-82.
176. Id.
177. See John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework
for an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 425, 450 (2002).
178. See id. at 450-51.
179. See id.
180. Id.; see also Malloy & Krotoszynski, supra note 93, at 1169 ("Brandenburg
addresses speech activity designed to persuade someone to commit an unlawful act, not
speech designed to facilitate the commission of an unlawful act by a person who has already
decided to act.").
181. See infra Part II.C.3.
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Advocates of placing liberty above order naturally support a strict
application of the Brandenburg standard, allowing the speaker nearly
unrestricted free speech. 18 2  For strict constitutional rights proponents,
freedom is paramount. According to supporters of a strict application of
constitutional rights in schools, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools."' 83 Such supporters are not concerned with what students may be
exposed to at school, rather they are concerned with giving students the
opportunity to share in a "'marketplace of ideas."'" 8 4 "The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth out 'of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.""' 8 5 Supporters of
a strict application of the Brandenburg test desire students to gain exposure
to various ideas irrespective of the content.18 6
Justice Abraham Fortas proclaimed in Tinker that students do not "shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."' 87 In fact, many believe that full constitutional rights
should be extended to students while at school and use these powerful
words as justification. 188 According to supporters of a strict application of
constitutional rights in schools, leaving too much discretion in the hands of
school authorities displaces federal courts' power under the Constitution.'
89
They further assert that the easing of constitutional rights and privileges
will result in "undesirable . . . social effects: increased segregation,
continued inequality of school funding, suppressed student speech, and lost
privacy rights for students." 190
It is also argued that infringement of fundamental rights secured by the
Constitution will cause tremendous hardships for "insular minorities."'
191
Traditionally, "insular minorities" have been associated with racial
minorities. 192 However, staunch supporters of this notion classify students
as "insular minorities" because they are unlikely to rely on the political
182. See supra Part II.A.
183. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) ("Students in school as well as out of school are
'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State
must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.").
184. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
185. See id. at 512.
186. See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text (discussing a student's freedom of
access to a marketplace of ideas).
187. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. "In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves
of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students." Id.
at 511.
188. See infra notes 189-204 and accompanying text.
189. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHt.
L.J. 111, 131 (2004).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 133.
192. See id.
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process for sufficient protection under the law.193 "[S]tudents [do not] have
political power to protect their First or Fourth Amendment rights through
the political process. For student[s'] rights, courts must take action or there
will be no protections at all."' 194 The "deconstitutionalization" of education
poses a severe threat to students because they "cannot trust the other
branches of government."1 95
Another approach offered by supporters of a strict adherence to
constitutional rights in school attempts to teach by example. Schools try to
teach students about the democratic principles of fairness and equality, and
it is argued that they should practice what they preach.196 "[I]f educational
institutions are not subject to the same constitutional constraints as other
governmental agencies, students will not come to an understanding of the
value of a democratic, participatory society, but instead will become a
passive, alienated citizenry that believes that government is arbitrary." 197
This argument operates under the assumption that democratic values are
taught to students by more than formal instruction. 198
A final approach to a strict adherence to constitutional rights in schools
was presented by Justice William J. Brennan in his majority opinion in
Board of Education v. Pico.199 In this case, the Court held that the
Constitution would not bar school officials from removing books from a
school library that are "pervasively vulgar" or educationally unsuitable.2 00
Although Justice Brennan permitted the school to restrict some of the
reading materials in school libraries, he promoted students' access to a
marketplace of ideas and choice among different ideas and schools of
thought.20' According to Justice Brennan, access to different ideas
"prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic,
often contentious society in which they will soon be adult members. 2 02
However, despite the fact that Justice Brennan allowed schools to prohibit
books that are "pervasively vulgar," he expressed deep concern about the
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See generally Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between
Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647 (1986).
197. Id. at 1654 (footnote omitted).
198. See generally RICHARD E. DAWSON ET AL., POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION: AN ANALYTIC
STUDY (2d ed. 1969); ROBERT WEISSBERG, POLITICAL LEARNING, POLITICAL CHOICE, AND
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP (1974); Edgar Litt, Civic Education, Community Norms, and
Political Indoctrination, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 69 (1963).
199. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
200. Id. at 871.
201. See id. at 868; see also Martin D. Munic, Case Comment, Education or
Indoctrination-Removal of Books from Public School Libraries: Board of Education,
Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 68 MINN. L. REv. 213, 216-17
(1983). "The first amendment's objective of preserving a free marketplace of ideas from
which enlightened discussion will ultimately lead to truth is especially important in a school
setting because students are entitled to, and a quality education requires, exposure to a broad
range of ideas." Id. (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
202. Pico, 457 U.S. at 868.
[Vol. 77
2008] RECONCILING MORSE WITH BRANDENBURG 273
possibility of the abuse of discretion: "If a Democratic school board...
ordered the removal of all books written by or in favor of Republicans, few
would doubt that the order violated the constitutional rights of the students.
. .. "203 For Justice Brennan, the Constitution permits prohibiting vulgarity
in a school setting, but "does not permit the official suppression of
ideas."204 Justice Brennan concluded that by allowing students exposure to
different ideas, students will be better equipped to become functioning
members of a vastly diverse society.
On the other hand, those supporting a strict application of Brandenburg
in order to achieve a sense of liberty put less emphasis on the special
circumstances necessary to create an orderly and effective environment for
America's schoolchildren. "The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular
and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against
the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior." 2 05 Although the absolute protection of the
fundamental right may become diluted, the protection over the essential
nature of the rights remains pure.20 6  To create an effective learning
environment for the entire school, school officials argue that they must be
able to establish order, which may be achieved by curtailing certain
individual rights. 20 7  "Even the most heated political discourse in a
democratic society requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of
the other participants and audiences." 20 8 According to the Supreme Court,
this notion that order, in certain situations, must precede liberty is an
essential and deeply rooted practice of government. 20 9 In an example
offered by the Court, the Manual of Parliamentary Practice, drafted by
Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the House of Representatives, prohibits
the use of "impertinent" speech during debates and other proceedings. 2 10
Not only has the Court recognized that order, in certain situations, comes
before liberty among adults and in government, the Court has also
developed an understanding that order and regulations are necessary to
ensure the positive development of the nation's schoolchildren. In
203. Id. at 870-71.
204. See id. at 871.
205. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
206. See generally Bd. of Educ. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002);
Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
207. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 681-82.
210. See id. Written by Thomas Jefferson in 1801 while he was Vice President, the
Manual for Parliamentary Practice became America's first book on parliamentary procedure.
This book contains fifty-three sections and each section includes rules and practices of the
British Parliament along with the applicable texts from the U.S. Constitution and the thirty-
two Senate rules that existed in 1801. See generally THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
(Washington City, S.H. Smith 1801).
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Ginsberg v. New York, 211 the Court upheld a New York statute banning the
sale of sexually oriented materials to children, even though the materials
were entitled to First Amendment protection regarding adults.212 The Court
indicated that there should be limitations on the interests of the speaker in
reaching an unlimited audience where the audience may include children. 213
The Court again limited the scope of the First Amendment in Pico by
giving public school officials the authority to remove books from a public
school library that were considered vulgar.214 These cases exhibit the
"obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting in
loco parentis, to protect children-especially in a captive audience." 215
2. The Special Case of Drug Speech: Evaluating the Persuasiveness of
Pro-drug Speech and Antidrug Speech
The majority in Morse recognized the risks of drug abuse among
students: as Chief Justice Roberts wrote, "'[m]aturing nervous systems are
more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are; childhood
losses in learning are lifelong and profound; children grow chemically
dependent more quickly than adults, and their record of recovery is
depressingly poor.' "216 By compromising a student's memory and learning
ability, drug abuse robs a child of all the fruits offered in a public school
education. 217  In addition, "[r]esearch shows that students who use
marijuana don't do as well in school, as compared to their non-using
counterparts[, and a] teen user's odds of dropping out are more than twice
that of non-users." 218 Not only do drugs have terribly detrimental effects
on schoolchildren, but drugs have infiltrated the fabric of many American
public schools.219 In 2000, more than fifty percent of teens said drugs were
used, kept, or sold at their school.220 Drug abuse has become a serious
problem within American public schools in large part because of the
211. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
212. See id. at 645.
213. Id.
214. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-
72 (1982).
215. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). In loco parentis
translates directly to mean "in the place of a parent," and refers to a temporary guardian of a
child that takes on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
803 (8th ed. 2004).
216. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007) (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1995)).
217. See Marijuana and Academic Success Questions and Answers,
http://www.theantidrug.com/drug__info/marijuana-and-academic-questions-and-answers.asp
(last visited Aug. 16, 2008).
218. Id.
219. See Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Youth
Risk Behavior Surveillance-United States, Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep., June 9,
2006, at 1, 19 (explaining that about twenty-five percent of high school students have been
offered, sold, or given an illegal drug on school property within the 2006 year).
220. See NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV.,
NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE VI: TEENS, at iii (2001).
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introduction of students to drugs at an early age: in 2005, about half of
American twelfth graders had used an illicit drug, as had more than a third
of tenth graders and about one-fifth of eighth graders. 221 Today, instead of
learning at school, many students are experimenting with drugs, which
deprive them of necessary values essential to become a functioning member
of society and will ultimately lead to serious problems later in adulthood. 222
In the First Amendment context, speech about drug use has special force
among adolescents. Messages advocating illegal drug use are routinely
followed; school boards resoundingly cite peer pressure as the most
important factor prompting schoolchildren to take drugs.223 "[S]tudents are
more likely to use drugs when the norms in school appear to tolerate such
behavior." 224 Moreover, pro-drug messages are conveyed in an inviting
form to naive schoolchildren and neglect to inform their audience of the
dangers implicit in drug use: "television, films, radio, music, and newsprint
journalism can deliver much more attractive images of drug use than
parents are capable of counteracting in their antidrug efforts. '225 With
students internalizing such pro-drug messages, the risks are great for future
health related issues and an interruption in the learning process. 226
While the rationale for a strict Brandenburg application relies on the
opportunity for "more speech" in order to counteract student speech
positively portraying drugs, 227 Professor Gilbert J. Botvin suggests that
school, government, and parent antidrug messages fall on deaf ears.2 28
Paradoxically, these antidrug messages often produce the opposite intended
effect on their audience: "[I]t has been suggested that antidrug
commercials, instead of presenting a persuasive case against the use of
drugs, may serve as a source of information which may be perceived as
subtle support for their use."' 229 With drug abuse among teenagers on the
rise over the last two decades, it now has become a "rite[] of passage for
many American youth. '230 To combat the recent drug epidemic, schools
have devised educational programs aimed at informing youths about the
negative impacts of drugs.231  However, these programs have proven
inadequate, as students have ignored the message completely or found
logical flaws in the arguments being advanced by school officials: "the
221. See NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, MONITORING THE
FUTURE: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUGUSE: 1975-2005, at 202 (2006).
222. See Gilbert J. Botvin, Substance Abuse Prevention: Theory, Practice, and
Effectiveness, 13 CRIME & JUST. 461, 462 (1990).
223. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007).
224. Id.
225. MARSHA MANATT, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PARENTS PEERS AND POT II:
PARENTS IN ACTION 148 (1983).
226. See supra notes 216-25 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
228. See Botvin, supra note 222, at 462.
229. F. Earle Barcus & Susan M. Jankowski, Drugs and the Mass Media, 417 ANNALS OF
THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. Sci., 86, 92 (1975).
230. Botvin, supra note 222, at 462.
231. See id.
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'formal operational' thinking of the adolescent facilitates the discovery of
inconsistencies or logical flaws in arguments being advanced by adults ....
which may in turn permit rationalizations for ignoring potential risk[s]." 232
Even government programs designed to halt drug use in teenagers have
failed. Similar to school-based programs, government programs often send
the wrong message: "When teens are told by program leaders to admit that
they are helpless against the power of drugs-a standard approach-they
lose faith in the program's efficacy." 233 Not only are the programs failing
to adequately equip students with the skills to combat drug abuse, but they
actually exacerbate the problem.234 Many experts see the cause of the
ineffectiveness of governmental programs as a general misdiagnosis. 235 In
fact, one in six teens forced into treatment programs do not even fit the
criteria for a "substance abuse disorder." 236
Not only is government-sponsored counter-speech ineffective, parental
advisement regarding the dangers of drugs also has failed to prompt a
change in student behavior 237 As teenagers begin to drift away from their
parents and toward their peers, fellow classmates who partake in drug abuse
fill the vacuum as influential members of a student's life and lead the
student down a dark path.238 "An increased reliance on the peer group
may... facilitate the promotion of substance use among individuals who
are members of peer groups that hold various supportive attitudes toward
substance abuse." 239 With peers having the most influence over students,
the argument for "more speech" by school officials, government, or parents
to counteract school drug problems seems to be a moot point.
3. Other Constitutional Rights Relaxed in a School Setting
It has been suggested that, because students learn best in an orderly
environment, pro-drug messages, disrupting that order, may severely
232. Id. at 471; see also Joel H. Brown, Marianne D'Emidio-Caston & John A. Pollard,
Students and Substances: Social Power in Drug Education, 19 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y,
65, 73 (1997) (explaining that a random survey done in California of 5,045 students in
grades 7-12 showed that over 40% of California's students were "not at all" influenced by
drug education programs, 15% were influenced "a lot," and nearly 70% described a neutral
or negative effect towards the program).
233. Maia Szalavitz, Drug Treatment Leads to Substance Abuse, in TEEN DRUG ABUSE:
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 126, 126 (Pamela Willwerth Aue ed., 2006). "[A] 1996 study
published by Bill Miller, professor of psychology at the University of New Mexico, found
that those adults who most accepted the idea of personal powerlessness had the most severe
and dangerous relapses. Since teenage identities are fluid anyway, encouraging them to
view themselves as powerless addicts may cement an anti-social identity that a teen was just
trying on for size." Id.
234. See id. at 128. "[R]ecent research suggests that parents and schools may be sending
binge-drinking/social marijuana smokers off to treatment and getting back crackheads in
their stead." Id.
235. See id. at 130.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. Id.
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hamper a student's ability to learn.240  Recognizing that the school
environment is a unique setting, the Supreme Court has already started to
relax students' other constitutional rights in the school setting.24 1
In New Jersey v. TL. .,242 the Supreme Court upheld a search by school
officials of a high school girl's purse, reasoning that the need to maintain an
orderly environment at school required an easing of the restrictions set forth
in the Fourth Amendment regarding government searches. 243 In this case,
the Court relaxed the "probable cause" requirement necessary to conduct a
search under the Fourth Amendment by establishing a "reasonable cause"
standard that school employees needed to fulfill in order to conduct a
search.244
In addition, the Court relaxed another Fourth Amendment right in
Vernonia School District 4 7J v. Acton.245 In this instance, the Court upheld
a school's policy authorizing random drug testing of student athletes. 246
This decision was predicated upon the existence of a serious drug problem
among the school's athletes. 247 "Justice [Antonin] Scalia ... found that the
program did not violate the Fourth Amendment .. . [and] stressed that
students have a relatively minimal privacy interest, especially when
compared to the schools' significant interest in stopping the use of illegal
drugs." 24 8
The Court has also relaxed the enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause within the confines of a school
environment. Under this clause, adults are entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard.249 In Goss v. Lopez,25 0 the Supreme Court held
that, before being suspended, a student is entitled to "notice" of the charges
and an "opportunity" to respond to them. 25 1 However, the Court concluded
that "notice" and an "opportunity" to respond to the allegations may occur
within "minutes" of the misconduct and under some exigent circumstances,
"prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon." 252
240. See supra Part II.C.1-2.
241. See infra notes 242-55 and accompanying text.
242. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
243. See id. at 339.
244. See id. at 341. The Court deferred to school officials, declaring that "strict
adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause" would undercut "the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools."
Id. The Court also established a new two-prong test for judging the reasonableness of a
search conducted by school officials: (1) whether the search was justified at its start, and (2)
whether the search was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the initial
interference. Id.
245. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
246. See id. at 665.
247. See id. at 649.
248. Chemerinsky, supra note 189, at 128.
249. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
250. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
251. See id. at 581.
252. See id. at 582. Interestingly, one constitutional provision that has been strictly
complied with by schools is the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The
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Those who support a relaxed application of constitutional rights in
schools do not view student and adult rights as "coextensive. '253 One
justification for the easing of constitutional rights is that "the Framers did
not intend the First Amendment to include children; children are too young
to fully exercise First Amendment rights; restrictions on these rights are
necessary for the state to safeguard the child's future rights; and fewer
rights are warranted to protect the parents' authority over the child. '254
Here, supporters argue that the framers purposely excluded schoolchildren
from its protection during the drafting of the Constitution.255
As previously stated, school students hold a unique status within
American society, thus calling into question the degree to which
constitutional rights should be applied.256 Given (1) the need to establish
order to ensure a quality education, (2) the serious threats caused by pro-
drug speech, and (3) the growing trend of the Supreme Court to ease
students' constitutional rights, many argue that students' constitutional
rights should be relaxed within a school setting.257
III. A RELAXED BRANDENBURG STANDARD SHOULD APPLY To DRUG
SPEECH IN A SCHOOL SETTING
This part argues in favor of applying a relaxed Brandenburg standard to
drug speech in a school setting. The Court in Morse permitted the
prohibition of student speech on the grounds that it promoted illegal drug
use.258 However, the Morse Court failed to incorporate the principles of
Brandenburg, which directly relate to speech promoting illegal acts.259
Under Brandenburg, a court can prohibit speech without violating the First
Amendment rights of the speaker when the speech is "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action." 260 By not adequately addressing Brandenburg in Morse, the Court
created a new test from a narrow holding.261 However, if the majority had
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment forbids a school from favoring one religion
over another or from favoring religion over nonreligion. See U.S. CONST. amend I.
Although there is no straight and narrow path to follow when implementing the
Establishment Clause within a school environment, courts have required schools to
accommodate all religious beliefs. See Lisa A. Brown & Christopher Gilbert, Understanding
the Constitutional Rights of School Children, 34 APR Hous. LA. 40, 43 (1997).
253. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
254. Jennifer L. Specht, Note, Younger Students, Different Rights? Examining the
Standard for Student-Initiated Religious Free Speech in Elementary Schools, 91 CORNELL L.
REv. 1313, 1324 (2006).
255. See id.
256. See supra Part II.C.1-2.
257. See supra Part II.C. 1-2.
258. See supra Part I.C. 1.
259. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
260. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
261. See supra Part I.C.1.
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applied Brandenburg in a relaxed fashion, then it could have reached the
same result without the need to develop a new test.262
When applied in a school setting, the traditionally strict application of the
Brandenburg test should be relaxed.263 According to the Supreme Court in
Fraser, "the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. ' 264 In
fact, the Court has encouraged the easing of constitutional regulations in the
school setting. 265 The Court in Hazelwood acknowledged that schools may
regulate some speech even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school.26 6 Furthermore, it is widely recognized that pro-
drug messages have a profoundly negative impact on schoolchildren. 267
This great threat to our nation's children has been recognized and
articulated in Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion in Morse.26 8 With
student speech jurisprudence in favor of giving schools the authority to
restrict otherwise unregulated speech to create order, and the great danger
posed to American schoolchildren by the threat of drugs, the Brandenburg
test should be applied and relaxed in a school environment. 269
Although Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg applied Brandenburg to
the facts of Morse in their dissent and ultimately decided that Morse did not
satisfy the Brandenburg standard, they failed to consider the serious
dangers posed by student drug abuse and ignored the Supreme Court's trend
toward relaxing other constitutional rights in the American school setting to
create a sense of order.270 The dissenting justices failed to consider that a
relaxed application of the Brandenburg standard would have resulted in a
formula that was able to combat the problem of drug advocacy in American
public schools, while also remaining consistent with the notion of easing
constitutional regulations in a school setting. 271
The American educational system plays a key role in shaping the minds
of our country's future citizens and leaders. 272 As such, a strict application
of the Brandenburg standard will foster an environment rampant with
speech that seriously jeopardizes and undermines the very principles that
our school system seeks to teach. 27 3 In contrast, a relaxed application of the
Brandenburg standard, which eases the rigid imminence requirement on
both the intent and effect elements, will enable schools to greatly reduce the
262. See supra Part II.B.
263. See supra Part II.B-C; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
(1982); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
264. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
265. See supra Part II.C.3.
266. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part II.C.2.
268. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
269. See supra Part II.C.
270. See supra Parts II.C.2, II.C.3.
271. See infra notes 316-26 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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dangers to schoolchildren implicit in messages advocating for social harms
such as drug abuse. 274
Both liberty and order are of paramount importance in a democratic
society. In order for that democratic society to flourish, it needs to educate
its young about the fundamental values of democracy.275 Keeping in mind
the importance of our nation's future, schools should have the discretion to
implement educational programs in order to teach these fundamental
values. 276 Therefore, it is necessary for schools to maintain order even at
the expense of restricting certain liberties enjoyed by adults.277
Although school boards should follow a relaxed application of
Brandenburg because a message promoting illegal drugs enhances the
dangers to students and the overall school environment, a relaxed standard
should also be implemented because the Supreme Court has relaxed other
constitutional rights in American schools. 278
Not only are students and adults afforded different applications of the law
under the Constitution, the "special characteristics" of a school environment
also factor into this decision. Students, as a captive audience, are not fully
developed intellectually, emotionally, or physically. 279  As such,
educational institutions have an obligation to protect students and "provide
them with an atmosphere conducive to education, and ... to inculcate the
social, moral and political values of the community (however defined) and,
in particular, to prepare the young to participate as citizens in our
democratic society." 280 In order to establish this productive atmosphere,
"[school officials] prevent[] access to alternative ideas ... [to] subordinate
the individual's constitutional rights to the interest of others in the
educational enterprise." 281
Not only are there independent notions supporting the relaxation of some
fundamental rights in schools, but the Supreme Court has also offered its
support. 282 In both T.L.0 and Goss, Justice Lewis F. Powell emphasized
the special relationship between student and teacher that makes it senseless
to afford them the same constitutional protections granted to both in a
nonschool setting. 283 In Justice Powell's view, "the relationship between
student and teacher is akin to that between child and parent, and thus
274. See infra notes 316-26 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
278. See supra Part II.C.3.
279. See Levin, supra note 196, at 1678.
280. Id.; see also Melissa LaBarge, "C" is for Constitution: Recognizing the Due
Process Rights of Children in Contested Adoptions, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 323 (1999)
("The United States Constitution does not contain any specific reference to children, parents,
or families. Nothing about children or parents appears in the records or debates leading to
the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.")
281. See Levin, supra note 196, at 1679.
282. See supra Part II.C.3.
283. See supra notes 242-52 and accompanying text.
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students should not have the same expectation of privacy as the population
generally." 284
Clearly the primary concerns for school authorities are to maintain order
and establish an effective learning environment. These concerns have not
gone unrecognized by the Supreme Court: "[w]e have recognized that
'maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of
flexibility in the school disciplinary procedures and we have respected the
value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship.' 285
School officials fear that a strict application of fundamental rights in
schools will "legalize" traditional functions of the school, placing authority
once held by school administrators in the hands of the court. Not only
would it undermine a school's authority, but it would also interfere with the
creation of an effective learning environment. For example, the legalizing
effect on a school's suspension process could put a chill on its desired
purpose. 286 "[F]urther formalizing the suspension process and escalating its
formality and adversary nature may ... destroy its effectiveness as part of
the teaching process. '"287 Because of the framers' intent to exclude certain
rights from children; the special characteristics implicit in schools; the
strong support in Supreme Court precedent; and the realization that fears of
"legalization" severely outweigh any individual interest, the Supreme Court
has correctly relaxed many student constitutional rights in schools, and the
Brandenburg standard should be next in line.288
Although supporters of a strict Brandenburg application argue that
Brandenburg was created to promote a greater sense of freedom over
political speech, a relaxed approach to Brandenburg in a school setting
targeted at combating pro-drug speech avoids the concerns of strict
Brandenburg advocates. 289  In the cases leading up to Brandenburg,
governing political speech that promoted unlawful acts posed a serious
threat to First Amendment liberties. 290 During this period, the Court was
undecided on how to deal with political speech of this nature.29 1 It was this
concern that led to the articulation of Brandenburg's rigid incitement
test.292 "The Brandenburg Court tried to summarize in a paragraph the
developments that have redefined the constitutional position of
revolutionary advocacy." 293
Since its creation, a strict application of the Brandenburg test has
effectively been applied in cases governing political speech that advocates
284. Levin, supra note 196, at 1671.
285. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) (quoting New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)).
286. See id.
287. See id. at 583.
288. See supra Part II.C.3.
289. See supra Parts II.A., II.C.2.
290. See supra notes 47-78 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 47-78 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 47-80 and accompanying text.
293. Linde, supra note 83, at 1163.
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unlawful action.294 For example, in Claiborne Hardware, the Court
concluded that boycott leader Charles Evers's remarks "contained highly
charged political rhetoric lying at the core of the First Amendment. '295 Not
only did the Court view this speech as political, but it also validated the
manner in which it was presented. 296  "Strong and effective
extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet
phrases." 297  Clearly, the Court viewed the Brandenburg standard as a
medium for permitting speech of a political nature, even if that speech leads
to future violence. 298 According to the Court, "[a]n advocate must be free
to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity
and action in a common cause." 299
Advocates of a strict Brandenburg standard in a political speech situation
may even look to the traditional school speech jurisprudence in order to
justify their conclusion.300 One source of validation comes from Tinker,
where the Court held that controversial political speech was permitted so
long as it did not materially or substantially interfere with the school or the
rights of others. 30 1 Only under a relaxed Brandenburg application can a
test giving partial deference to order over liberty in a school setting be
justified in light of the First Amendment. 302 A student may convey his
personal opinion "even on controversial subjects like the conflict in
Vietnam, if he does so without materially and substantially interfering with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and
without colliding with the rights of others." 30 3
Furthermore, Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg in their dissent in
Morse recognized the importance of protecting political speech under the
First Amendment. 304 According to the dissenting justices, the majority
ignored the fact that the issue of legalizing marijuana was of considerable
concern in Alaska.305  In fact, the dissent chronicled the history of
marijuana use and possession in Alaska to establish that it was an issue of
great importance. 306 These Justices viewed opinions regarding marijuana
294. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
295. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 926-27 (1982); see also
supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
297. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 928; see also supra notes 144-50 and
accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
299. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 928.
300. See supra Part I.A.
301. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
302. See supra Part II.C. 1.
303. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (citing
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (internal quotations omitted).
304. See supra Part I.C.2.
305. See supra Part I.C.2.
306. See supra Part I.C.2. The dissent explains that in 1975 the Alaska Supreme Court
protected the right of adults to possess up to four ounces of marijuana for personal use. In
1990, Alaskan voters attempted to recriminalize marijuana possession. However, at the time
Frederick unfurled his banner, the constitutionality of that referendum had not been tested.
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use as important political speech deserving protection: "[i]n the national
debate about a serious issue, it is the expression of the minority's viewpoint
that most demands the protection of the First Amendment. '30 7  As
articulated in Tinker and reaffirmed in Morse, it is clear that freedom of
political speech is one of the most cherished and coveted rights under the
First Amendment; as such, the Brandenburg standard should be strictly
applied in order to uphold this sacred right for students.
However, proponents of a strict Brandenburg standard in a school setting
have nothing to fear if a relaxed Brandenburg application is applied in
situations concerning speech advocating for illegal drug use. Because pro-
drug speech does not constitute political speech, it will not require the same
strict scrutiny as purely political speech. 30 8 In fact, the dissent in Morse
recognizes this argument. "Our First Amendment jurisprudence has
identified some categories of expression that are less deserving of
protection .... -"309 Examining the facts of Morse, it is clear that the student
intended to fulfill his ambition of appearing on television by unfurling a
pro-drug banner and did not argue that his banner was intended to convey
any sort of political or religious message. 310
Restricting speech concerning illegal drug use or any advocacy of
unlawful action in the school setting does not infringe on the same
fundamental values as restricting political speech. "[S]peech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.",311 Not only is freedom of speech concerning political views
ultimately protected under the First Amendment, it is a foundation upon
which this nation was established. 312 Under this interpretation, a strict
application of Brandenburg to political speech in the school setting is
appropriate. However, speech advocating illegal drug use is not an
essential and fundamental constitutional right. As previously stated, pro-
drug messages inevitably lead to student drug abuse. 313 Unlike varying
political viewpoints that cause growth and awareness of others under a
"marketplace of ideas" 314 theory, speech advocating illegal drug use has no
beneficial effect on the viewers or society whatsoever. 315 While speech
Finally, sections 11.71.090, 17.37.010-17.37.080 of the Alaska Statutes "rejected a much
broader measure that would have decriminalized marijuana possession and granted amnesty
to anyone convicted of marijuana-related crimes." Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2650
n.8 (2007).
307. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2651.
308. See supra Part I.C.2.
309. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2650; see also supra Part I.C.2.
310. See supra Part I.C.1.
311. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
312. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 357-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Framers "amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly
should be guaranteed").
313. See supra Part II.C.2.
314. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (citing
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
315. See supra Part II.C.2.
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advocating an unpopular political viewpoint in a school setting is protected
under a strict application of Brandenburg, a relaxed application of
Brandenburg in a school setting involving pro-drug speech does not carry
with it the same concerns of infringing on a basic fundamental right
essential to American liberty.
Now that recent studies have established that pro-drug messages are a
serious problem in American schools, the Brandenburg standard should
adequately adapt to meet this new and very dangerous challenge. In order
to meet the threat of social harms in schools, the Brandenburg standard
should be applied with a relaxed imminence requirement for both the intent
and effect prongs. 316 With relaxed imminence, the school can have the
discretion to reasonably restrict speech that it believes could endanger the
student as an individual or the student body as a whole. 317 Just as the Court
held in T.L.0 and Vernonia, the school should be able to act according to its
discretion when it is confronted with a potential harm.318
Applying the imminence requirement of the Brandenburg test strictly in
a school will prove to be highly unrealistic. 319 A message may intend for a
student to commit a lawless act at some unknown time in the future that
will be just as detrimental to the student as if it were intended for him to
comply with the message immediately.320 For example, if a student wore a
t-shirt to school with the language "Smoke Pot; It's Fun," there is no
immediacy to that message. The student is clearly promoting smoking
marijuana to his classmates, but has not indicated his intent for them to
smoke marijuana immediately. Although there is no intent of immediacy,
an observing student may make the decision to purchase drugs in the near
future that will inevitably have the same outcome for that student as a t-shirt
stating "Smoke Pot Now; It's Fun." In both cases, the end result is the
same. The observing student will be conducting a lawless and extremely
dangerous act harmful to him and others around him. The fact that the
current Brandenburg standard, as it stands outside the school context,
would restrict the second message but not the first is absurd and illustrates
the unrealistic and paradoxical nature of this flawed test.321
Not only should the imminence requirement regarding the intent element
of the Brandenburg standard be relaxed, but so too should the imminence
requirement pertaining to the effects portion of the test.322 Just as with the
relaxing of the imminence requirement of the intent element, the relaxing of
the imminence requirement of the effects element will restrict speech that
will ultimately harm a student who conforms to the message and those
around him.
316. See supra Part I.B.
317. See supra Part II.B.
318. See supra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
319. See supra Part II.B.
320. See supra Part II.B.
321. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the "likelihood" portion of the effects element should be
relaxed in a school setting. As previously stated, students' minds are more
malleable than those of adults. 323 A message promoting drugs may be more
likely to affect children than adults.324 The naivet& of schoolchildren must
be taken into account when determining the likelihood that a message will
ultimately become harmful. 325 A relaxation of the imminence requirement
on the effects element will better equip school officials to restrict speech
(particularly speech advocating for illegal drug use) that would increase the
likelihood of a harmful, lawless act in a school setting because when speech
promotes the use of illegal drugs, the likelihood that a schoolchild will
follow it is very high. 32 6
As previously stated, the school environment contains special
characteristics that must be considered in order to ensure an effective
learning environment. 327 As such, a relaxed Brandenburg standard will
enable school officials to secure an orderly environment. 328 In addition, it
will better equip school officials to deal with pro-drug speech. 329 Lastly, it
will remain consistent with the Supreme Court's trend towards relaxing
other constitutional rights within a school setting. 330
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance on the issue of whether
or not Brandenburg and its test prohibiting speech inciting imminent
lawless acts likely to produce harm should apply in the school setting.331
The Court had the opportunity to address this issue when it arose in Morse,
but ultimately avoided it by failing to thoroughly discuss Brandenburg.332
The little attention the Brandenburg test did receive came from the
dissent. 333 However, the dissent applied Brandenburg strictly without
regard for the extreme problems posed by drug abuse in the American
school system and ignored the Supreme Court's trend towards relaxing
constitutional rights when applied to schoolchildren. 334
Although the Brandenburg standard has yet to be applied in a school
setting, it should not be forgotten. 335 If applied correctly, Brandenburg can
be used effectively in restricting speech advocating for illegal drug use in
323. See supra Part II.C.2.
324. See supra Part II.C.2.
325. See supra Part II.C.2.
326. See supra Part II.C.2.
327. See supra Part II.C.
328. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
330. See supra Part II.C.3.
331. See supra Part I.C.1-2.
332. See supra Part I.C. 1-2.
333. See supra Part I.C.2.
334. See supra Part I.C.2.
335. See supra Part lI.B.
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American public schools.336 With drug use on the rise in American schools
and the fact that counter-speech is seen to be extremely ineffective in
combating student drug abuse, the Brandenburg standard provides schools
with the means to extinguish pro-drug speech on site.337 Furthermore, the
Court should feel comfortable in justifying the relaxation of Brandenburg's
elements because it has repeatedly done so in the past in cases involving
students and other constitutional rights, including freedom of speech
cases. 338 In addition, the Court has made a habit of recognizing order as a
prerequisite to ensure liberty.339
Finally, a modification of the Brandenburg standard is not complicated.
By merely easing the imminence requirement on both the intent and effects
prongs, a more natural, circumstantial standard will evolve, giving school
officials much needed deference to create a sense of stability and order
essential to foster an effective learning environment. 340
336. See supra Part III.
337. See supra Part III.
338. See supra Part II.C.3.
339. See supra Part II.C.1.
340. See supra Part III.
[Vol. 77
